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This publication is a product of the World Bank. It is part of a larger effort by the World 
Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy 
discussions in Pakistan and around the world. Working Papers are also posted on the Web at 
http://econ.worldbank.org. The main author may be contacted at twalker@worldbank.org. 
 
  
Abstract 
 
As part of its energy sector reforms, the Government of Pakistan plans to reduce spending on 
electricity subsidies to 0.3-0.4 percent of GDP by mid-2016. The reforms will alleviate a 
major constraint on the government’s budget. However, they will necessitate increases in the 
price of electricity, which have the potential to measurably reduce the welfare of the poor. 
The government will need to carefully design the price increases and provide associated 
compensation to avoid this outcome. 
 
This paper demonstrates that that it is possible for the government to protect the poor 
against most of the costs of the reform while at the same time improving the targeting of 
remaining subsidy expenditures. Measures that can be taken include targeting subsidies 
based on poverty scores and providing targeted cash compensation to poor households. We 
illustrate how these measures could be implemented, and estimate their associated welfare 
impacts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Working Paper disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange 
of ideas about development issues. An objective of the paper is to get the findings out 
quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of 
the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions 
expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent 
the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the 
governments they represent. 
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Electricity Subsidies Largely Benefit Non-Poor Households 
 
1. The Government of Pakistan provides several subsidies to electricity consumers; in 
2012-13 (FY 13), these collectively amounted to 1.5 percent of GDP (Figure 1). By far the 
largest is the Tariff Differential Subsidy (TDS), which comprised 96 percent of electricity 
subsidies in FY 13. The TDS is a payment from the government to compensate electricity 
utilities for the difference between their cost-recovery tariffs and lower actual tariffs 
charged.1 The government uses the TDS to set a single national tariff for each consumer type 
and to provide additional subsidies to some consumers.2 In FY 13, half of electricity subsidies 
went to households, one quarter to industry, and the remainder to agriculture and low-
consuming businesses. 
 
 
 
 
Notes: * Estimate based on provisional 2014 NDT (not yet notified). ** Based on 2013 IMF Article IV targets.  
 
2. Subsidies are allocated according to consumer type and electricity use. For 
households, electricity use is divided into ‘slabs’ (1-100 kilowatt hours (kWh), 101-200 kWh, 
etc.). Each slab is charged at a separate rate per kWh, and the rate increases from one slab to 
the next. In FY 13, a household that used 75 kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity in a month 
would have paid Rs 5.79 per kWh, while a household that used 750 kWh would have paid Rs 
5.79 per kWh for the first 100, Rs 8.11 for the next 200, and so on as indicated in Table 1. It is 
important to note that even heavy electricity users therefore received concessional tariffs on 
their initial consumption—and, because almost all tariffs were set at or below cost, the 
subsidy was larger for heavier consumers (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Cost-recovery tariffs are the tariffs which, if paid in full by electricity consumers, would fully cover utilities’ 
allowed costs. These are determined by the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA).  
2 The consumer types are residential, commercial/industrial and agricultural. The TDS is used to compensate the 
higher-cost utilities for receiving insufficient tariff revenue, since some utilities have higher costs than others (e.g. 
those with more rural consumers). 
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Unit of Consumption 
(Slab) 
Tariff per Unit 
May 2012 Oct 2013 
Lifeline Consumers: 
1 to 50 kWh 2.00 2.00 
All other consumers: 
1 to 100 kWh 5.79 5.79 
101 to 200 kWh 8.11 8.11 
101 to 300 kWh 8.11 12.09 
301 to 700 kWh 12.33 16.00 
701+ kWh 15.07 18.00 
 
Average Cost of Electricity Supply: 14.66 13.70
3
 
  * Pakistan also charges a time-of-use (TOU) tariff for households with a sanctioned load above 5 kW and a special 
TOU meter. The TOU tariff varies depending on the time of day that the electricity is consumed. Very few households 
have a sanctioned load above 5kW, so the TOU tariff is not considered in this analysis. In general, converting 
households to TOU meters will improve subsidy targeting, as it will charge heavy users cost-recovery tariffs on all 
consumption.  
 
 
 
 
Notes: Excludes minimum monthly charge.  
 
 
3. A highly concessional ‘lifeline tariff’ is provided to households that use less than 50 
kWh per month. Lifeline tariffs are used in a range of countries (including Ghana, Vietnam, 
and parts of India) to help the poor afford a minimum amount of electricity. The rate offered 
to these low-consuming households is well below the rate on the first slab paid by non-
lifeline consumers (Table 1). The lifeline tariff in Pakistan is relatively ineffective, however, 
because only about 3 percent of consumers use less than 50 kWh per month (Figure 3). 
 
                                                          
3 Provisional NEPRA-determined tariff for FY 14 (not yet notified). The cost of electricity supply is projected to 
fall from FY 13 to FY 14 because (i) there are fewer prior-year costs to recover (i.e., the difference between actual 
and projected costs from the previous year) and (ii) the regulator reduced the amount of technical losses it allows 
utilities to recover through revenue. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Rs/kWh 
Monthly Consumption (kWh) 
May '12 avg cost 
Oct '13 avg cost 
May '12 avg tariff 
Oct '13 avg tariff 
Residential Electricity Tariff Schedules* Table 1 
Average Residential Tariff for Various Consumption Levels Figure 2 
Reforming Electricity Subsidies in Pakistan 
4 
 
 
4. The government recently modified the tariff structure to limit heavy users’ access to 
concessional rates. In October 2013 (FY 14), the government switched from the above ‘all-
slab benefit’ structure to a ‘previous-slab benefit’ structure, in addition to increasing tariffs 
on slabs above 200 kWh per month (Table 1). Under the previous-slab benefit, a household 
in a given slab now pays the rate on the slab immediately below for all electricity up to that 
slab’s lower bound, and the rate on that slab for the remainder. For example, if a household 
consumes 750 kWh in a month, it now pays Rs 16 per kWh for its first 700 kWh and Rs 18 
per kWh for the next 50. This change limited heavy users’ access to concessional rates which, 
combined with tariff increases on the top three slabs, substantially reduced subsidies for 
higher levels of consumption. However, most households continue to receive a net subsidy 
(Figure 2). 
 
5. Despite the recent tariff adjustments, we estimate that only 28 percent of electricity 
subsidies reach the poor (Figure 4).4 There are three reasons for this. First, electricity 
consumption is only weakly related to poverty, so many non-poor households pay the 
concessional tariffs granted to low electricity users and thus benefit from subsidies. This can 
be seen in Figure 3, which shows how the breakdown of household electricity usage varies 
depending on the size of total monthly expenditure (a proxy for living standards). This policy 
is still protecting the vast majority of households, even those in the top quintiles. Second, 
even though the October 2013 notifications notably reduced subsidies for the heavier users, 
they still granted a net subsidy to households using up to around 500 kWh per month 
(Figure 2), many of which are non-poor. Third, electricity subsidies provide no benefit to 
households without electricity access.5 
 
 
 
Source: PSLM Survey, 2010-11. 
  
 
 
 
                                                          
4 In this note, we use the term ‘poor’ to refer to the 40% of households with the lowest living standards in 
Pakistan (measured by total monthly expenditure). These are households that are either poor by national 
definition, or are vulnerable to becoming poor if they experience a large shock. We use the term ‘extreme poor’ to 
refer to the poorest 20% of households by this measure. 
5 It was not possible to distinguish precisely from the survey data whether households were officially connected to 
the grid. In this note, we define ‘households without electricity access’ as those which reported zero electricity 
expenditures in the survey. The actual number of households connected to the grid may differ from this estimate 
if (i) some households were temporarily not paying for an existing connection; or (ii) households reported other 
types of electricity expenditures in this category (e.g. the cost of batteries, generators or portable power units). 
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Source: PSLM Survey, 2010-11. 
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Without compensation, subsidy reform would have significant 
negative impacts on the poor 
 
6. Between FY 13 and FY 16, the government plans to reduce its subsidy bill from 1.5 
percent of GDP to 0.3-0.4 percent. Due to the aforementioned October 2013 tariff increases, 
the 2014-15 budget estimates that subsidies fell to around 1.2 percent of GDP in FY 14. To 
reach 0.4 percent by FY 16, the government will need to further increase electricity prices. 
This will have a direct impact on the affordability of electricity, but will also affect economic 
activity and the price of other goods. 
 
7. In this note we estimate the likely impact of the reforms on household welfare and 
simulate the effect of various compensation measures. Based on the forecast cost of 
electricity, we first determine what electricity price increases would be required to meet the 
subsidy targets. We then use a whole-economy macroeconomic model to predict the impact 
of the electricity price increases on GDP growth, inflation, and household consumption. 
Finally, we use household survey data to estimate the likely impact of the reforms and 
compensation on household welfare, measured as the change in households’ cost of living. 
Details on the modeling process are provided in the Annexure. 
 
8. We consider a reform scenario in which electricity prices increase sufficiently to reach 
the subsidies targets, and no compensation is provided. This scenario takes as given the 
October 2013 tariff increase and assumes no further price changes in FY 14. For FY 15 and 
FY 16, it assumes the lifeline tariff stays fixed but all other residential electricity prices 
increase by up to 20 percent.6 The assumptions are summarized in Tables A1 and A2 (See 
Annexure). Commercial and industrial prices are both assumed to increase by 14 percent 
each year, while agriculture sector electricity prices are assumed to remain somewhat 
subsidized and thus increase by 8 percent in FY 15 and 1 percent in FY 16. The impacts of this 
scenario are compared to a ‘no-reform’ baseline in which all prices increase at the same rate 
as the average cost of electricity supply.7 
 
9. Under the reform scenario, macroeconomic modeling predicts that overall prices 
would increase slightly, and GDP growth would be slightly lower. By FY 16, overall prices 
would be 1 percent higher due to pass-through of increased electricity costs. The increase in 
overall prices would slightly dampen real GDP growth, although the impact is minimal. From 
FY 14 to FY 16, real GDP would grow at an average annual rate of 4 percent, compared to 4.2 
percent under the baseline. The effect on household income growth is analogous. The full set 
of macroeconomic forecasts is presented in Table A3 (See Annexure). 
 
10. Partial equilibrium modeling of household demand indicates that all households 
would face a welfare loss from the reform. The 97 percent of electricity users who are not 
currently covered by the lifeline would face a direct welfare effect in the form of higher 
electricity bills. All households—including lifeline consumers and those without electricity 
access—would also suffer an indirect welfare effect due to the increase in overall prices, 
                                                          
6 We assume that residential tariffs will not be increased above the cost-recovery tariffs determined by NEPRA; 
for some slabs this means that tariffs will rise by less than 20 percent under the scenario. 
7 In order to estimate the total effect of the reform, the baseline does not include the October 2013 adjustment, 
since it occurred as part of the reform process. 
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however it is important to note that this effect would be relatively small. By FY 16, the 
welfare of poor households would be 1.7 percent lower, on average, than under the baseline 
(Figure 5). The impact on wealthier households would be higher both in absolute terms and 
relative to their total consumption. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
11. These estimates should be seen as a lower bound on the potential impacts of the 
broader electricity sector reform agenda. In conjunction with the changes to subsidy policy, 
the government is undertaking various structural reforms to the energy sector intended to 
improve its efficiency and capacity. These include addressing financial losses by the utilities, 
reducing commercial and technical losses, and improving operational and procurement 
efficiency. It has been estimated that these reforms could increase GDP significantly, in 
which case the indirect effects presented above may be less negative or even positive.8 
Therefore these simulations should be seen as a lower bound on the likely welfare impact of 
the reforms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 World Bank (2014), ‘Program Document for a First Power Sector Reform Development Policy Credit’, Report 
No. 86031-PK, April 3, 2014. 
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Subsidy design changes and compensation can protect the poor and 
improve the targeting of public expenditure 
 
12. The above analysis demonstrates that the poor may face a welfare loss as a result of 
the reforms. Although the impact is not substantial relative to the effects of other economic 
shocks, the visible rise in the cost of living may strengthen resistance to the reforms and 
detract from the key message that removing untargeted subsidies frees resources to improve 
the electricity supply and increase social spending on the poor. Therefore it is advisable for 
the government to consider some form of targeted compensation to ensure that the poorest 
households are no worse off as a result of the reforms. In this section we examine three 
compensation options: (i) providing an immediate top-up to the BISP monthly cash transfer; 
(ii) targeting subsidies to the poor; and (iii) providing a temporary, targeted cash transfer to 
the poor. 
 
Provide a top-up to the BISP monthly cash transfer 
 
13. To mitigate the immediate impact of tariff increases on the poorest households, the 
government will increase the monthly cash benefit paid by the Benazir Income Support 
Programme (BISP). This benefit is given to the poorest 22 percent of households in Pakistan. 
The government has just announced a Rs 300 per month top-up to the BISP benefit in order 
to compensate the poorest households for the costs of the reform. This will raise the benefit 
per household to Rs 1,500 per month. We estimate that the BISP top-up will on average 
halve the welfare impact of the reform among the extreme poor (Figure 6). 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
14. The government could also consider indexing the BISP monthly cash benefit to 
inflation. Future reforms and other shocks may further increase prices and adversely affect 
the welfare of the poor. By indexing the BISP cash transfer to inflation, the poorest 
households would automatically receive a benefit increase in the event of rises in the cost of 
living, diminishing the impact on their welfare. 
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Target subsidies based on poverty indicators 
 
15. If the government wishes to retain electricity subsidies, they should be targeted to the 
poorest households. In order to do this, it would be necessary to determine who qualifies for 
compensation. The utility companies have some data on customers that could be used to 
determine eligibility.9 However, these data are unlikely to be good proxies for poverty, and 
may suffer from inaccuracies or be missing for some households.10 A preferred option would 
be to use the existing National Poverty Registry to objectively determine which households 
are poorest. The National Poverty Registry (NPR) is a national database of poverty scores for 
each household in Pakistan that is used to deliver other social assistance to the poor (most 
notably BISP benefits).11 
  
16. Poverty scores are a significantly better indicator than electricity use for targeting 
subsidies. Targeting the bottom 40 percent of households based on their poverty scores 
would capture the majority of poor households with electricity access. However, if we take 
into account those without access, only two-thirds of all poor households would benefit from 
this policy (Figure 7). If it is not possible to target the bottom 40 percent, and subsidies are 
restricted to BISP households, only 41 percent of poor households would benefit from 
targeted subsidies. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Coverage of Targeted Subsidies by Poverty Score Figure 8. Benefits Incidence of Subsidies (FY 16) 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
                                                          
9 These include house size (e.g., number of rooms), sanctioned electricity load, and geographical area. 
10 For any of these, it would be necessary to evaluate the relationship between the proposed change and poverty 
before making the changes on the grounds that it would improve targeting. House size, for example, is even less 
related to poverty than electricity use and so would perform worse than the kWh cut-off as an eligibility criterion. 
The relationship between other proxies and poverty could not be evaluated with the household survey used in this 
study. 
11 Poverty scores are indexes of household characteristics, including asset ownership and family composition, 
which provide a relatively good proxy for households’ actual poverty status. While not as precise a measure of 
poverty as total monthly expenditures (used this in paper), poverty scores can be easily constructed for all 
households based on census data, whereas it is not feasible to collect expenditure data for every household. 
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17. Targeting subsidies based on poverty scores would allow the government to easily 
reach its FY 16 subsidy target. In Figure 8, we assume that utilities retain subsidized tariffs 
for the bottom 40 percent of households by poverty score, and charge everyone else a tariff 
consistent with cost recovery. This policy would make the remaining subsidies expenditure 
substantially more progressive, with almost 60 percent of subsidies going to poor 
households. The subsidy target would easily be reached; retaining existing subsidized tariffs 
for the bottom 40 percent of poverty scores would cost less than 0.3 percent of GDP. 
   
18. Introducing a targeting mechanism would take time to implement, however, and may 
pose logistical challenges. A feasibility study would be needed to determine whether, and 
how, the NPR can be merged with utility billing databases. Following this, a process of 
validation and registration would be required. Thus the shift to targeted subsidies is a 
medium-term policy option. The government may decide to refrain from tariff increases on 
the lowest brackets until the targeting system is functional, though doing so would 
necessitate steeper price hikes for heavier consumers. 
 
19. In addition, targeting subsidies would still exclude many poor households from 
compensation. To mitigate this, the government could set up a grievance redressal 
mechanism to allow excluded but genuinely poor households to have their poverty scores 
reviewed12, or could consider retaining less generous subsidies for households with higher 
poverty scores. Even with such measures, targeted subsidies will have no benefit for 
households without electricity access (currently 15 percent of the poor). In addition, fully 
targeting subsidies would imply eliminating all subsidies for the non-poor. To reduce the 
adjustment costs on these groups, the government should consider gradually phasing out 
subsidies for untargeted households. 
 
Provide a temporary, targeted cash transfer to the poor 
 
20. A temporary cash transfer to the poor would achieve better coverage than targeted 
subsidies. A cash transfer could be paid to all eligible households through commercial banks. 
This process has been used previously in Pakistan to compensate victims of natural disasters. 
The cash transfer could be administered by the Ministry of Water and Power, contracting the 
National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) for identification and provincial 
governments for registration. Community validation can be used to verify the eligibility of 
households. Registering the bottom 40 percent of households by poverty score (other than 
those already registered for BISP) would take time to complete. However, this approach has 
the virtue of compensating all households regardless of electricity access, resulting in 
coverage of 89 percent of the extreme poor and 78 percent of the poor (Figure 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Such a system is presently used to review cases of exclusion in BISP. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
21. The amount of cash compensation required to compensate poor households would be 
relatively small compared to the anticipated savings from the reform. While the top-up to the 
BISP benefit fully compensates the extreme poor on average for the welfare effects of the 
reform in FY 14 and FY 15, a further cash transfer of around Rs 200 per month would be 
required by FY 16 if the BISP benefit is not indexed. A Rs 200 per month transfer would cost 
the government less than ten percent of the Rs 132 bn saved in subsidies expenditure in that 
year alone. If the government chose to compensate all households in the bottom 40 percent 
with a temporary cash transfer, it would cost Rs 44.2 bn (for a transfer of around Rs 300 per 
month per household). Even allowing for the cost of implementing this compensation, these 
amounts are easily affordable given the fiscal savings from the reform. 
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Adequate compensation and clear communication are essential to 
ensure the sustainability of energy subsidies reforms 
  
22. International experience has shown that strengthening social safety nets and 
demonstrating a commitment to protecting the poor are essential components of successful 
energy subsidy reform. To ensure the reforms are broadly accepted and politically 
sustainable, the government should put in place measures to minimize or mitigate negative 
welfare impacts on the poor. This paper proposes three compensation measures: 
adjustments to BISP benefits; targeting remaining residential electricity subsidies based on 
poverty scores; and providing temporary, targeted cash compensation to poor households. 
 
23. A combination of measures may be necessary to balance the immediate need to 
protect the poorest with the ultimate objective of compensating the poor and improving 
targeting. The government has already announced a top-up benefit to the BISP monthly cash 
transfer, a measure that will partly compensate beneficiary households for the reforms. We 
recommend the government also consider indexing the BISP benefit to inflation to cushion 
beneficiaries against future energy price increases. In the medium term, the government 
could move from targeting subsidies based on electricity consumption to targeting based on 
poverty scores, or replace tariff subsidies with targeted cash transfers. These latter measures 
will take time to implement, given the need for feasibility studies and the roll-out of the 
targeting and registration systems. In the meantime, a variety of other measures could also 
help alleviate the short-run impact of the reform on consumers. These include timing tariff 
increases to coincide with periods of low electricity use, promoting energy efficiency, and 
improving the efficiency of electricity generation and distribution. 
  
24. Finally, the government should develop a comprehensive communications campaign 
for the reforms, tailored to a variety of audiences. The campaign should reassure the public 
that the poor will be protected against the welfare impacts of the reform, and provide a clear 
roadmap for the reform process. The government can use the communications campaign to 
explain the benefits of the reform, such as improved infrastructure investment and electricity 
service, better targeted social spending, and more sustainable fiscal expenditures.  
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Annexure 
 
This Annexure describes the methodology and assumptions underlying the analysis. Our 
analytical framework has three parts. First, we forecast the average cost of electricity supply 
for FY 14, FY 15, and FY 16. We calculate the increases in electricity prices required to lower 
electricity subsidies from 1.5 percent of GDP in FY 13 to 1.2 percent in FY 14, 0.7 percent in 
FY 15, and 0.4 percent in FY 16. Second, we use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
model for Pakistan to forecast what impact these price increases will have on GDP growth, 
household income and inflation. Finally, we use the latest available national household 
survey data to model the household-level welfare implications of these macroeconomic 
forecasts under various compensation scenarios. 
 
Part A: Subsidy Targets & Tariff Changes 
 
For the cost of electricity supply, we use the weighted average NEPRA-determined tariff 
(NDT) across all utilities in Pakistan. For FY 14, we use provisional NDTs, which suggest the 
average cost will be Rs 13.70 per kWh. We assume changes in the NDTs will be driven by a 
combination of fuel oil prices (60 percent weight) and overall inflation in Pakistan (40 
percent weight). The price of fuel oil is taken from staff estimates, and is forecast to decline 
gradually to USD 89.30 per barrel in FY 16. For inflation we use figures from the IMF World 
Economic Outlook (October 2013), augmented by the estimated marginal effect of electricity 
price changes taken from the CGE model. Overall inflation for the baseline scenario is 
expected to pick up to 8.9 percent in FY 15, then drop to 6.9 percent in FY 16. Inflation 
forecasts under the reform scenario are about one percentage point higher. These give a 
projected average cost in FY 16 of Rs 15.54 per kWh for the baseline, and Rs 15.63 per kWh 
for the reform scenario. 
 
To calculate total electricity subsidies as a share of GDP, we take the per-unit difference 
between the projected NDT for each consumer class and the electricity price charged to each 
consumer class and multiply that difference by the amount of electricity consumed by each 
consumer class. We then sum those amounts across consumer classes to calculate the total 
electricity subsidy needed, and divide that figure by GDP. This calculation implicitly assumes 
that electricity subsidies are defined as the payments the government needs to make to all of 
the utilities to compensate them for the difference between their allowable costs and tariff 
revenues (this is the definition of the Tariff Differential Subsidy, or TDS).13 We assume that 
electricity consumption by each consumer class increases at the same rate as GDP. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 If the IMF expanded its definition of subsidies to also include, for example, the equity given by the government 
to the power sector to clear accrued debt for mismatches between payments made and revenue received, then a 
larger electricity price increase would be required to bring total electricity subsidies down to 0.4 percent of GDP. 
That would magnify the impacts on the poor presented here and require higher compensation. 
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We develop a reform scenario for electricity prices the government might set to achieve the 
subsidies reduction targets. We assume that an equalization surcharge (or other mechanism 
to maintain uniform national tariffs without a government subsidy) is applied to charge 
consumers a price above the minimum NDT and shift revenue from lower-cost utilities to 
higher-cost utilities.14 The October 2013 tariff increase is taken as given and there are no 
additional FY 14 price increases. For FY 15 and FY 16, the lifeline tariff stays fixed but all 
other residential electricity prices increase by up to 20 percent.15 Commercial and industrial 
prices are both assumed to increase by 14 percent each year, while agricultural prices are 
assumed to remain somewhat subsidized, increasing by 8 percent in FY 15 and 1 percent in 
FY 16. Table A1 details the average increases assumed in this scenario, and Table A2 details 
the tariff schedules assumed for residential consumption. 
 
 
 FY14 FY15 FY16 
Residential 21% 18% 16% 
Commercial 21% 13% 14% 
Industrial 36% 13% 14% 
Agriculture tube wells 23% 8% 1% 
 
 
 
 FY14 FY15 FY16 
Lifeline: Up to 50 kWh/month 2.00 2.00 2.00 
1-100 kWh 5.79 6.89 8.27 
101-200 kWh 8.11 9.65 11.58 
101-300 kWh 12.09 14.39 17.26 
301-700 kWh 16.00 18.59 19.72 
700+ kWh 18.00 20.58 21.83 
Note: From October 2013, residential tariffs (aside from the lifeline tariff) follow a ‘previous-block tariff’ structure, 
where households are charged two rates for their consumption: one rate for the final bracket they fall in for all 
consumption in that bracket, and the rate from the lower bracket for all consumption below the cut-off for the final 
bracket. For example, a household consuming 750 kWh in one month in FY 15 would pay Rs 18 for its 701st-750th 
kWh and Rs 16 for its 1st to 700th kWh. 
 
Part B: Macroeconomic Model 
 
We use the Global Trade Analysis Project Computable General Equilibrium Energy 
Substitution (GTAP-E CGE) model to simulate the whole-economy impacts of the subsidy 
                                                          
14 This assumption does not change how we would calculate the prices charged to each consumer class. However, 
without the assumption of this or another revenue-transfer mechanism, even if consumer prices were set equal to 
the weighted average NDT, the government would still have to pay a subsidy to compensate higher-cost utilities 
for charging consumer prices below their cost-recovery tariffs. Assuming an equalization surcharge or other 
revenue-transfer mechanism means we are assuming the government can essentially transfer revenue from 
lower-cost utilities (for whom the uniform national tariffs applied are above their cost-recovery tariffs) to higher-
cost utilities. 
15 We assume residential tariffs will not be increased above the cost-recovery tariffs determined by NEPRA; for 
some slabs this means that tariffs will rise by less than 20 percent under the scenario. 
Electricity Price Increases Under Reform Scenario (Annual Nominal Increase) Table A1 
Residential Electricity Tariffs Under Reform Scenario (Rs per kWh) Table A2 
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reduction path and price increases detailed above.16,17 We then we use the outputs of the CGE 
model as parameter settings for a partial-equilibrium model of household demand 
(described in the next section), which yields estimates of the welfare effects of the reforms 
and potential compensatory measures. 
 
Main Simulation Results 
 
In the macroeconomic modeling stage, GTAP-E model simulations yield for FY 14, FY 15 and 
FY 16 the household consumption, income growth and average price changes under the 
baseline and reform scenarios. The modeling exercise comprises two parts. First, we 
developed a baseline using the built-in dataset for Pakistan in the GTAP-E model (based on 
GTAP database version 8). Economic growth rates are taken from IMF country reports; 
other parameters (e.g. population growth) for the baseline are taken from the IMF World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) database, WDI, UN Data and other official forecasts. Second, we 
developed a set of scenarios based on the projected increases in consumer electricity prices 
and decreases in government subsidy expenditures described previously.  
 
The model distinguishes electricity as a separate consumption item in the household budget. 
On the supply side, electricity is produced using three different types of energy (coal, natural 
gas and fuel oil) that are either domestically produced or imported. The baseline is developed 
on the hypotheses that world fuel oil prices (the main input used in electricity production in 
Pakistan) will decrease over the next three years.18 The removal of subsidies is treated as an 
exogenous shock on producer and consumer prices. Each consumer type is affected 
differently as a result of the removal of electricity subsidies (as described in Table A1). On the 
production side, the CGE model describes the pass-through effect of subsidy removal in 
terms of possible increases of producer prices, which is likely to result in an increase in the 
average price level. Simultaneously, favorable trends in the world oil market predicted for FY 
14 and FY 15 will help to attenuate the inflationary impact of subsidy removal. Energy 
intensive sectors are predicted to be the most affected by rising electricity prices. On the 
consumer side, two effects are predicted. The Pakistan economy will perform better under 
the IMF program; faster growth would result in increased income levels (both for skilled and 
unskilled labor) in the medium term (Table A3). 
 
 
  FY 13 FY 14 FY 15 FY 16 
Baseline scenario 
    GDP (constant USD billions, 2007) 134.1 138.9 144.3 151.5 
GDP growth (yoy % change) 2.80 3.60 3.94 5.15 
Household income (yoy % change) 3.38 3.59 3.41 4.68 
Consumer prices (average, yoy % change) 8.33 8.26 8.87 6.88 
     Reform scenario 
    GDP (constant USD billions, 2007) 134.1 138.4 143.7 150.8 
GDP growth (yoy % change) 2.80 3.25 3.78 4.96 
Household income (yoy % change) 3.38 3.24 3.19 4.74 
Consumer prices (average, yoy % change) 8.33 8.28 8.99 7.37 
                                                          
16 For this exercise, only the price increases in Table A1 were simulated. 
17  For further details, see Hertel, T. W. (1997), Global Trade Analysis, Modeling and Applications, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/ 
18 http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/GEP/GEP2014a/Commodity_Markets_Outlook_2014_January.pdf 
Predicted Macroeconomic Impacts of the Reform Table A3 
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General assumptions     
World fuel oil prices (yoy % change, constant 2010 USD) 0.00 0.10 -2.14 -4.49 
 
Part C: Household-level Model 
 
We apply the outputs from the macroeconomic modeling to a partial-equilibrium model 
based on the 2010-11 Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) Survey. 
The model takes observed electricity consumption for FY 11 and projects it forward to FY 13 
based on consumption growth, inflation and changes in electricity tariffs. We assume there 
are no demographic or technological changes over that time and that total household 
consumption grows uniformly at the rate predicted by the CGE model. However, we allow 
each household’s electricity demand to evolve over time based on income and price growth 
rates and associated demand elasticities. From FY 14 to FY 16 we forecast electricity 
consumption and total household consumption under the baseline and reform scenarios. A 
cost of living index is calculated for each household based on electricity and non-electricity 
prices and their respective expenditure shares. The welfare impact of the reforms is found by 
comparing real consumption under the baseline and reform scenarios (valued at reform 
scenario prices). 
 
In this model, the reforms have three channels of impact on households: (i) a growth effect, 
captured by the CGE model’s estimates for GDP growth; (ii) a direct effect on electricity 
prices and demand, captured by the price of electricity in the cost of living index and the 
elasticity of demand for electricity; and (iii) an indirect effect on other prices, estimated 
through the CGE model and applied to real consumption through the cost of living index. We 
then simulate a range of different scenarios using assumptions about cash transfers that the 
government might provide to compensate for the negative impact of the reforms (described 
in the next section), and estimate how these affect the overall welfare calculus for each 
consumption quintile. 
 
For a given household i, the implied quantity of electricity consumed by each household each 
month,   , is recovered from the observed monthly electricity expenditure,    (net of taxes 
and charges19), by inverting the all-slab benefit pricing formula which was in effect during 
the survey period and applying the prevailing tariff, tax and fee rates in 2010-11: 
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19 The calculations used to recover electricity expenditure before taxes and charges are omitted for clarity and are 
available upon request. The taxes accounted for in this calculation are: (i) VAT of 17%; (ii) excise duty of 1.5%; (iii) 
a Neelum-Jhelum surcharge of Rs 0.10 per kWh for non-lifeline consumers; and (iv) a Rs35/month Pakistan 
television fee for those households with a television. 
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where    is the tariff per kWh in bracket j,    is the upper bound for bracket j, and n is the 
total number of brackets. Note that there is a minimum charge of Rs 75 per household per 
month, and that the lifeline tariff rate, p1, applies only to consumers below b1 (currently 50 
kWh per month). Otherwise, all households benefited from the tariff in each bracket. 
 
We assume that the household’s total expenditure grows each year at the same rate as 
nominal household consumption (obtained from the CGE model). The quantity of electricity 
consumed is updated each year based on the change in the marginal price of electricity for 
each household, dpi,t , and real household consumption growth, gt, according to the following 
formula:20 
 
                          
 
where  = -0.17 is the price elasticity and  = 0.8 the income elasticity of demand for 
electricity.21 The change in the marginal price of electricity is just the change in the tariff for 
the block in which the consumer was located in the previous year. 
 
Using the formula above for     , we update the household’s electricity expenditure in each 
subsequent year based on projected consumption. Under the previous-slab benefit formula 
adopted in October 2013, the calculation becomes: 
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As discussed in the text, for the time being there is an artefact in the tariff calculation for 
consumers in the fourth bracket (201-300 kWh), who pay the second bracket (1-100 kWh) 
tariff for their first 200 kWh. This is also accounted for in our calculations. 
 
Defining    as the unit cost for electricity at time t, the subsidy to the consumer can be 
calculated as follows: 
 
                . 
 
We will refer to the total cost of electricity, including taxes and fees, as     
 . We keep taxes 
and fees separate in the calculation of the subsidy bill, since these revenues do not accrue to 
the ministry responsible for subsidies. The welfare effect of the reforms is defined as the 
amount of compensation      in current rupees that each household would need to receive in 
order to enjoy the same real consumption under the scenario as they would have under the 
                                                          
20 This formula can easily be obtained by applying the Envelope Theorem to the first-order conditions of a 
standard, two-good consumer maximization problem. 
21 These estimates are taken from Hertel et al (1997, op. cit.). 
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baseline.22 Let     
  be the cost of living index for consumer i in period t under the baseline 
assumptions, and     
  be the counterfactual cost of living for the same consumer under the 
reform scenario. Then we can define      as follows: 
    
      
    
  
    
 
    
  
Rearranging for     , we have: 
         
 
    
 
    
      
  
 
We define the cost of living indices     
  and     
  following a chained Laspeyres price index with 
two goods: electricity, and all other items. The expenditure share of electricity (  
 ) is 
estimated from the household survey data. The cost of living index is then defined 
individually for each household as follows: 
 
     
(    
 )      
     
     
        
     
, 
 
where NEt is the CPI estimated in the CGE model and      is a household-specific index of the 
average cost of electricity including taxes and fees (relative to the base year 0): 
 
     
    
      
    
      
. 
 
It is important to note that we define the cost of living index relative to the base year in every 
case, so that the welfare comparison between baseline and counterfactual in each year 
measures the cumulative impact of all reforms up to that point. 
 
Cash Transfer Modeling 
 
We simulate cash transfer scenarios for two beneficiary groups: (a) existing BISP 
beneficiaries and (b) the poorest 40 percent of households ranked by PMT score. We assume 
that Pakistan would use this database to identify households to receive the cash transfer. The 
PSLM does not have PMT scores for each household, so we construct a PMT score using the 
official formula and equivalent variables from the survey. 
 
For each household, the simulated probability of receiving compensation, ρi, is defined as 
follows. For the first simulation, ρi is the propensity of BISP receipt for each (rounded) PMT 
score, taken from the poverty scorecard database for BISP beneficiaries. For a given centile 
of the PMT score distribution, ρi is estimated by taking the observed population share of that 
PMT score range, and dividing it by the corresponding population share from the PSLM 
(which is representative of the entire population). The result is then scaled so that the 
population total of the ρi sums to 1. For the second simulation, the reference group is all 
households at or below the 40th percentile of the PMT distribution (equivalent to a PMT 
                                                          
22 In demand theory this is referred to as the compensating variation. The calculations here assume a money-
metric utility function for simplicity, although the same results hold as long as we ignore the effects of relative 
price changes on baseline spending patterns. 
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score of 26.2).23 We assume that all households with a PMT score below this cutoff receive a 
cash transfer, so that ρi=1 if the PMT score is less than 26.2 and ρi=0 otherwise. 
 
We use an iterative program to solve for the compensation budget that exactly compensates 
the reference group, on average, for the impacts from the subsidy reform. The total budget, 
Tt, which fully compensates beneficiaries in the reference group (on average) for the welfare 
effect of the reforms in year t is defined as follows: 
 
   ∑       
 
   
 
 
We then solve for the values of    that achieve full compensation on average: 
 
∑   
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where wi is the frequency weight of household i, and n is the number of eligible sample 
households. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 In practice, the actual cutoff would need to be determined based on the poverty scorecard database. 
